BEHAVIORAL DETERMINANTS OF TAX PLANNING AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE BIASES, TAX RISKS, AND DIGITAL SOLUTIONS

Abstract

Introduction. Tax planning and corporate tax compliance are usually interpreted through legal norms, tax rates, sanctions, and control procedures. However, this view is too narrow for the contemporary business environment, where tax decisions are made under uncertainty, information overload, time pressure, and digital interaction with tax authorities. In practice, firms do not always behave as fully rational actors. Their tax choices are shaped by cognitive biases, internal routines, perceived fairness of the tax system, trust in public institutions, and the architecture of digital tax services. Purpose. The purpose of the article is to identify the behavioral determinants of corporate tax planning and compliance, to reveal the cognitive biases that distort tax decisions at the enterprise level, and to substantiate the role of digital solutions in reducing tax risks, increasing transparency, and supporting voluntary compliance. Methods. The study applies an interdisciplinary approach that combines behavioral finance, tax compliance theory, institutional analysis, and digital governance concepts. The methodological toolkit includes abstraction, comparison, systematization, logical generalization, and content analysis of recent academic publications, analytical reports. Elements of prospect theory, tax morale, and trust-based approaches are used to explain how firms interpret tax obligations and compliance choices in risky and uncertain settings. Results. The article demonstrates that corporate tax planning is influenced not only by tax law and financial calculations, but also by behavioral mechanisms. Overconfidence may lead managers to underestimate the probability of detection and the scale of future tax adjustments. Anchoring on previous tax practices may preserve outdated or risky solutions even after the regulatory environment has changed. Framing effects alter the perception of identical tax obligations depending on whether they are presented as a loss, a saved cost, or a compliance burden. Loss aversion increases the attractiveness of aggressive tax strategies when businesses perceive taxation primarily as an immediate reduction of liquidity. Moral licensing may also emerge when partial formal compliance is interpreted as sufficient justification for broader opportunistic behavior. At the same time, trust, perceived fairness, emotional background, and managerial traits affect tax morale and shape the willingness of firms to cooperate with tax authorities. Digital tax services substantially modify this field of decision-making. They lower transaction costs, standardize procedures, reduce information asymmetry, improve traceability of operations, and embed compliance into everyday business processes. Conclusion. Corporate tax planning should therefore be interpreted as a behavioral-risk-management process rather than as a purely technical minimization exercise. Effective tax compliance policy at the enterprise level must integrate three dimensions: behavioral diagnostics of managerial decisions, systematic tax risk control, and the proactive use of digital solutions. For Ukrainian enterprises, this integrated approach is especially relevant under conditions of economic volatility, regulatory change, wartime uncertainty, and the digital transformation of tax administration.